The Emergence of Newly Industrializing Countries Making Global Trade

Helleiner decries superpower take barriers as structural discrimination against smaller nations on champion strain and as impediments to independent NIC development on the other(a). Taking the cyclorama that developed countries either prevent NICs from competing head to head with products in which the developed world leads or oblige export-minded NICs to concentrate on exporting products that foster NIC dependence on mainstream markets. Limited stinting independence in turn limits the guarantee that a NIC will be able to service its outside(a) debt or mercenary paper, and Helleiner criticizes financial institutions in developed countries for advocating free trade as a principle instead of fostering the kind of frugal independence that would guarantee NIC repayments long term. Indeed, he proposes a form-only(prenominal) system of sanctions and reparations against countries--chiefly it seems of the EEC--that deliberately restrict trade in one form or another.

Yoffie details a point that Helleiner refers to simply does not develop: that protectionist trade policies, designed to entrench the wrench of traditionally powerful countries as against upstart entrants into foreign trade, were to different degrees circumvented by the aggressive and resourceful export efforts of Asia throughout the 1970s, with the last result that by 1980, some Asian NICs had achieved significant mo penetration in the U.S. Because they were bounce to lose any aim confrontation with the

Cline (1982) views the issue of export-led produce in NICs vis-a-vis free trade vis-a-vis protectionism by questioning whether the export policies of the four (now five) dragons of Asia could be duplicated in other NICs. The chief problem searchs to be whether import markets are thickset enough to accommodate additional market penetration. Cline concludes that history cannot adopt itself; the dragons were able to compete in a basically free-trade environment because they were virtually the only players on the scene. On this view, increased competition, from two NICs and developed countries, is likely to result in increased trade barriers or a target import market unavailing to absorb all the new players.

Helleiner, G.K. (1980).

International economic ail: essays in North-South relations. Buffalo: University of Toronto Press.

U.S., NICs exploited loopholes in protectionist legislation, illegally dumped unneeded inventory, bargained patiently, or otherwise adapted to American market customs duty and practice, always with an eye on long-term gains.

Eskridge, (1985). Les jeux sont faits: Structural origins of debt problem. Virginia diary of International Law, 25, 281-399.

Thus economic benefits in NICs may not be manifest throughout the culture but earlier serve the agenda of capitalist structure itself. The weakest in a society structured along capitalist traditionalist lines appear to benefit least from the structural transformation of South Korea from a dependent quasi-colony to a state-centered capitalist political environment. One is bound to wonder where the weakest will be positioned when the next structural crisis of the international political economy takes hold.

Park, K.A. (1993, January). Women and development--the case of South Korea. Comparative Politics, 25, 127-45.

Cline, W. (1982). quarter the east Asian model of development be reason out? The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment. Ed. C.K. Wilber. New York: Random House, 384-96
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