The information collected prior to the commencement of hostilities in 2006 was assessed and translated into intelligence at IDF intelligence headquarters in Israel. The process was centralized. Interpretations were refined and sanctioned by higher commanders. Intelligence was disseminated within a material of formal policy guidelines (Eshel, 2007; Eshel, 2006).
During the course of the conflict, the valuable resident intelligence operatives on which Israeli intelligence depended heavily were rendered virtually useless. The reason for this dilemma was the forced evacuation of civilians from the battle zone. Thus, during the course of the conflict, Israeli intelligence was denied to use of the most important element of its operations within Lebanon (Eshel, 2006).
Lessons Learned in Relation to Intelligence as a Result of the Experiences in the 2006 War
In the branch few days of the 2006 war, sen
Gray, C. (2006, November). The furnish Doctrine revisited: The 2006 National Security Strategy of the USA. Chinese ledger of International Law, 5(3), 555-578.
Eshel, D. (2007, July). The Israel-Lebanon War one year later. Journal of electronic Defense, 30(7), 26-34.
The intelligence-specific lessons learned from the experience in the war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon are somewhat less controversial than are the lessons that are associated with the long-standing air power debate. These lessons concern the generation, use, and distribution of intelligence, along with mindsets and assumptions that provide the framework within which intelligence is generated, used, and distributed. The intelligence-specific lessons that were learned are as follows (Eshel, 2006):
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